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DO THE CLOTHES MAKE THE MAN?
IMPLICATIONS OF A WITNESS' STATUS IN
THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Jessica Ward*
A couple walks up to a convenience store. The man waits in front
of the store while his female companion goes inside to purchase a
soda. The store's security guard follows the woman to the back of
the store, verbally harasses her and makes suggestive gestures.
When her male companion notices the trouble, he enters the store
and tells her to put down the soda and leave the store. At that point,
an altercation ensues between the security guard and the male. Both
men are bloodied. The male companion eventually breaks free of
the guard and runs out of the store. He calls 911 and reports that he
has just been assaulted at the convenience store and that he needs the
police and an ambulance. He then goes back to the store and waits
on the sidewalk for the police to arrive.
Presently, an officer arrives on the scene and approaches the
bloody customer who explains that he called 911. The officer tells
him to stand against the wall and stay still. The customer tells the
officer that he wants to press charges against the store's guard and
that the police should arrest him. However, the officer repeatedly
tells the customer to be quiet. The police officer does not inquire or
listen to the customer give his account of what happened. Instead,
the officer listens to the security guard's account. The guard says
that the male customer was trying to steal a soda. The guard goes on
to say that when he apprehended the alleged criminal, the customer
struck him. The guard claims that he reacted in self-defense by hit-
ting the customer. The policeman takes the guard at his word and
arrests the customer.
INTRODUCTION
Does the policeman have probable cause to arrest the customer?
Should the security guard's status as an authority figure be enough
to allow his statement to furnish probable cause to arrest? The
police must make credibility determinations on the spot. They do
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A. Communica-
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not have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Rather, they must evaluate
the situation they are confronted with and determine whether the
witness' statements supply the requisite probable cause.
As police enter a crime scene, they are often confronted with a
scenario like the one above. Typically, any number of witnesses
are willing to give their account of what happened. These wit-
nesses could be the victim, a random stranger, an authority figure,
or someone with a hidden agenda. Should the status of the witness
be dispositive of his credibility in the eyes of the officer making a
probable cause determination?
This Note examines police determination of probable cause
based on witness credibility. Part I sets out the probable cause
standard and details the relevant probable cause case law and the
policy considerations behind the Fourth Amendment. Part II ex-
amines different types of witnesses the police encounter and ana-
lyzes whether the status of the witness implies more or less
credibility. This Part also describes various eyewitnesses, including
ordinary citizens, putative victims, store guards, and police officers
to demonstrate the possible weaknesses of affording undue weight
to a particular witness based solely on status. Part III evaluates the
factors that officers apply in their determination of probable cause.
This Part argues for a flexible standard rather than a rigid rule re-
garding the determination of witness credibility. Finally, this Note
concludes that the status of the witness should not be determina-
tive, but rather should be just one of the factors the police take into
account when deciding whether probable cause exists.
I. DEFINING PROBABLE CAUSE
A. What is Probable Cause?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution gov-
erns all searches and seizures conducted by government agents.'
The amendment has a dual purpose: first, to prohibit unreasonable
searches and seizures; second, to require probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant.2 The Fourth Amendment does not literally
1. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Id.
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require probable cause to accomplish a warrantless arrest. How-
ever, in general, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures" as
requiring police to find probable cause prior to making an arrest.3
The Court has set out flexible standards for determining whether
there is probable cause for an arrest.4 As the language of the
Fourth Amendment is general, courts have had to interpret the lan-
guage to construct a probable cause standard. The courts have
generally interpreted probable cause to be a malleable standard.5
Probable cause exists when "at the moment the arrest was made
the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers' knowl-
edge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the sus-
pect had committed or was committing an offense."6 In Illinois v.
Gates,7 the Court held that probable cause does not involve hard
certainties, but rather probabilities.8 The Court termed the proba-
ble cause standard a fluid concept that turns on the "totality of the
3. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (holding that police of-
ficers must have probable cause to arrest in the absence of a warrant); Kevin J. Allen,
Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Introduction and Guide for
Users: I. Investigation and Police Practices: Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 88
GEO. L.J. 883, 883 (2000) (stating that probable cause is the level of suspicion re-
quired to justify certain governmental intrusions upon interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Fourth Amendment: Elusive Stan-
dards; Elusive Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 127 (1992) ("[S]eizures approach-
ing arrest in their intrusiveness ... require probable cause.").
The Court has recognized only a few exceptions to the rule that probable cause is
needed to make a search or seizure constitutional. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d
303, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) and
noting that a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), is an example of "a
brief investigatory detention" based merely on a reasonable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing). However, once a detention escalates to an arrest, probable cause is
needed to satisfy the constitutional demands of the Fourth Amendment. Gardenhire,
205 F.3d at 313.
4. See Poulin, supra note 3, at 127.
5. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980) (stating that "the constitu-
tional standard is as amorphous as the word 'reasonable"').
6. Miloslavsky v. AES Eng'g Soc'y, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 351, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,148 (1972); see also Calamia v. City of New
York, 879 F.2d 1025, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that probable cause exists when the
arresting officer has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been commit-
ted by the person to be arrested").
7. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
8. Id. at 238; see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding
probable cause upon a "fair probability" that the person committed a crime) (citation
omitted); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (holding that probable cause is a "prac-
tical, nontechnical conception") (citation omitted).
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circumstances." 9 In Ornelas v. United States,'° the Court continued
to rely on the facts of the situation in determining whether proba-
ble cause exists."
As the probable cause standard is flexible, there are no right or
wrong standards in its interpretation. 12 Police are not constitution-
ally required "to follow the best recommended practices."' 3 What
is "wise" and what is "compulsory" are two entirely different con-
cepts."4 "To collapse those two concepts is to put the judicial
branch in general superintendence of the daily operation of gov-
ernment, which neither the [F]ourth [A]mendment nor any other
part of the Constitution contemplates.' 15
The Court has held that when determining probable cause, po-
lice officers are to rely on their own experience and knowledge. 6
As one part of the probable cause determination, police officers
must weigh the evidence before them.' 7 In Wilson v. Russo,18
Chief Judge Becker engaged in what he termed the "routine proba-
ble cause analysis," which involved weighing the inculpatory evi-
dence against any exculpatory evidence in the hands of the
officer. 9 Law enforcement officials may not ignore potentially ex-
culpatory evidence when deciding whether to arrest someone.2 °
9. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
10. 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
11. Id. at 696 (holding that the rules of probable cause attain meaning only when
applied to the facts of the particular case).
12. Poulin, supra note 3, at 127.
13. Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 442 (7th Cir. 1986).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (holding that the evi-
dence used in determining whether probable cause exists "must be seen and weighed
not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement").
17. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 791 (3d Cir. 2000).
18. 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000).
19. Id. at 791; Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 649-50 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
arresting officers cannot ignore exculpatory evidence even if there is substantial incul-
patory evidence that points to the existence of probable cause).
20. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that arresting of-
ficers cannot "turn a blind eye" to exculpatory evidence before them); Kuehl, 173
F.3d at 651 (noting that arresting officer did not take exculpatory eyewitness testi-
mony into account); Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957-59 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a police officer violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by charging plaintiff
with two mutually exclusive offenses when confronted by two conflicting accounts);
BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding a lack of probable cause
when police officer failed to investigate evidence that would have illuminated the
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime). Contra Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 146 (1979) (holding that a police officer is not required to investigate all poten-
tially exculpatory claims before making an arrest).
2008
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B. Policy Behind the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court's elastic conception of the rule of probable
cause allows for a proper equilibrium between peacekeeping and
the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches or
seizures. 21 In Gerstein v. Pugh,22 the Court explained that the
probable cause standard does not demand scientific exactness, but
seeks a proper balance between law enforcement objectives and
citizens' rights.23 On one hand, the standard seeks to safeguard the
people from unreasonable intrusions on their privacy and unsub-
stantiated criminal charges.24 On the other hand, the rule gives po-
lice enough leeway to perform their law enforcement duties.25 As
defined by the courts, the probable cause standard achieves an ap-
propriate flexibility to account for the ambiguous situations police
officers often encounter.26 Courts must give law enforcement
enough maneuverability to allow for some mistakes on their part;
however, these mistakes must remain within the realm of reasona-
bleness. 27 As a standard of probabilities and reasonableness, prob-
able cause serves the function of keeping the opposing interests of
the police and the people in check.28
C. Duty to Investigate
The extent of an officer's duty to investigate is incorporated into
the probable cause analysis.29 Courts generally have not imposed a
stringent duty to investigate upon the police;30 rather, they fre-
quently describe the duty to investigate as a duty to be reasona-
21. Mandina v. Yonkers, 1998 WL 637471, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1998); see
also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting
that the "Fourth Amendment ... perform[s] the constitutional balance between po-
lice objectives and personal privacy").
22. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).




27. Id.; see also Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 1999) ("We must give
law enforcement officers 'substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing inferences
from factual circumstances,' but such latitude is not without limits.") (quoting United
States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465 (8th Cir. 1997).
28. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
29. Spiegel v. City of Chicago, 920 F. Supp. 891, 897 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Because the
'reasonableness' standard of the Fourth Amendment links the constitutional obliga-
tion to prudent conduct, when information an officer receives warrants further inves-
tigation a prudent officer must do more to determine probable cause.").
30. Id. (stating that the police need not conduct a mini-trial before arresting a
suspect, however, they must reasonably believe that a crime has been committed).
20011 2009
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ble.31' The duty to investigate depends on the circumstances of the
particular case.32 In some situations, courts do impose the duty on
the police.33 The duty to investigate is defined by the strength or
weakness of probable cause evidence.34 The existence of a "strong
basis" for probable cause will eliminate the need for further inves-
tigation .3  However, weak probable cause evidence necessitates
further investigation.36
Walker v. Spiller,37 an action for false arrest, exemplifies a court's
finding of weak probable cause evidence signaling a further duty to
investigate. 38 On a motion for reconsideration, Judge Brody va-
cated her grant of summary judgment to defendant officer Spiller
and ruled that the issue of the officer's failure to investigate could
be raised at trial.39 The court held that the police officer's failure
to investigate plaintiff Walker's alibi could constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation because the probable cause evidence was
weak.40 The police officer arrested Walker based on three pieces
of evidence. 41 First, Walker was connected to a series of other rob-
beries, based on another person's confession, which was later
found to be untrue.42 Second, the police relied upon the officer's
conclusion that Walker was a participant in a string of robberies.43
However, Judge Brody was unclear whether this pattern was cre-
ated by evidence before the court or simply by the detective's own
intuition.44 In the latter case, the evidence would not be sufficient
to support probable cause.45 Third, the police used a photo identi-
31. E.g., Brown v. City of Greenwood, No. CIV. A. 4:97CV87-D-B, 1998 WL
433927, at *4 (N.D. Miss. June 29, 1998) (finding that defining the duty to investigate
as one of reasonableness is a "point of law [that] is ingrained into constitutional
jurisprudence").
32. Spiegel, 920 F. Supp. at 897 ("Because probable cause is fact-specific, it follows
that the degree of investigation necessary to determine probable cause is completely
dependent upon the circumstances of each case.").
33. Id.
34. Walker v. Spiller, No. CIV.A.97-6720, 1998 WL 306540, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 9,
1998) (holding that a "failure to investigate must be weighed in the context of the




38. Id. at *6.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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fication of the plaintiff.46 The court deemed the identification to be
"problematic," as its reliability could not be determined from the
evidence before the court.47 Walker's sworn allegations that the
police physically abused him, verbally harassed him, and coerced
his confession at the time of his arrest further weakened the proba-
ble cause evidence brought against him. 48 Walker argued that the
police should have investigated his alibi on the basis of this shaky
probable cause evidence. 49 The court determined that this would
be a proper inquiry at trial.50
Courts typically frown upon incomplete or poorly conducted in-
vestigations, due to the risk of ignoring potentially exculpatory evi-
dence.5 Courts also have prescribed that police officers must be
"thorough,"52 or must "properly investigate."53
It is well established that once probable cause exists, there is no
duty to investigate further.54 In the same vein, the police are not
required to investigate a suspect's claim of innocence. 5 To do so
would allow a suspect to escape arrest simply by claiming that he
did not commit the crime. 56 However, if the police have indepen-
dent knowledge about the suspect's innocence, then they have a
duty to investigate.57
46. Id.




51. For a list of cases on point, see supra note 20.
52. Moore v. Marketplace Rest. Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1346 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[lIt is
incumbent upon law enforcement officials to make a thorough investigation and exer-
cise reasonable judgment before invoking the awesome power of arrest and
detention.").
53. Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 1982). Contra Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (finding no need to perform an "error-free investigation" of a
claim of innocence).
54. E.g., Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to hold police
officers liable for false arrest when, after finding probable cause, they failed to collect
evidence unknown to them); Vrusho v. Glosser, No. CIV.98-100-JD, 1999 WL 813948,
at *5 (D.N.H. May 19, 1999) ("Once probable cause for an arrest is determined, the
police have no further duty to investigate.")
55. See Pickens v. Hallowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding no duty
to investigate plaintiff's exculpatory claim even though she raised it at the time of her
arrest).
56. See Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (holding that neglecting to investigate a claim of inno-
cence over a period of time would violate due process); see also Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d
175, 179 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding that detaining an individual with actual knowledge of
his innocence could constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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Courts do not require police officers to investigate a suspect's
alibi before making an arrest. In Romero v. Fay,59 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the police's
failure to investigate the suspect's alibi did not negate probable
cause.60 The court found the police officer's belief that the alibi
witnesses would lie to protect the plaintiff to be reasonable.6'
In certain situations, courts create a duty requiring the police to
investigate further before arresting a suspect. For instance, the po-
lice are required to investigate when incarcerating a suspect.62
Likewise, the police are required to investigate basic evidence
before making an arrest. 63 An example of basic evidence would be
a readily available surveillance video from a robbery. 64 Addition-
ally, officers must "reasonably interview witnesses readily available
at the scene" of the crime.65
II. ASSESSING WITNESS' CREDIBILITY IN DETERMINING
PROBABLE CAUSE
Police determination of witness credibility plays a prominent
role in probable cause analysis. Police arrest suspects based on
probable cause determinations furnished by witness accounts.
However, law enforcement does not always arrest lawfully. For
those situations in which the police mistakenly arrest, the wronged
party is afforded redress under § 1983 of the United States Code.66
Section 1983 states in relevant part:
58. Criss, 867 F.2d at 263; see also Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that failing to investigate an alibi may be reasonable). Contra Simley v. City
of Ferndale, 181 F.3d 103 (6th Cir. 1999) (Moore, J., dissenting) (finding a duty to
investigate further when there is only weak evidence against a suspect).
59. 45 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1478.
61. Id.
62. Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 981 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[I]nvestigation must yield
objective circumstances justifying a good faith belief that there exists lawful authority
to incarcerate the prisoner.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Garcia v.
City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has held
that "detention without investigation could be unconstitutional" and citing Sanders v.
English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1992)).
63. Romero, 45 F.3d at 1476-77 (failing to investigate basic evidence would consti-
tute a Fourth Amendment violation).
64. Clipper v. Takoma Park, 876 F.2d 17, 19-20 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the
police lacked probable cause in part because of their failure to view prints taken from
a surveillance film of the alleged robbery).
65. Romero, 45 F.3d at 1476-77.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.6 7
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, rather it "provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere. '' 68 In an
action for false arrest, a plaintiff seeks amends for a violation of his
Fourth Amendment right to be "free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. '69 The existence of probable cause to arrest consti-
tutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false
arrest.70 In determining probable cause, "[t]he police must be held
to standards of reasonableness, not to standards of perfection." 71
The cases discussed in this Part are actions for false arrest, in which
the police officers' actions are evaluated for their reasonableness.
Law enforcement officers must make probable cause determina-
tions on a daily basis. Such determinations are relatively easy
when the situation is clear, for instance, when the police find a
smoking gun at the crime scene. However, the police often are
confronted with ambiguous situations in which they must exercise
proper judgment. Probable cause determinations become more
difficult when an officer comes upon conflicting accounts of what
has occurred.72 When faced with such a conflict, the police must
check those accounts for credibility.
The police may arrest a suspect as "long as a reasonably credible
witness or victim informs the police that [the suspect] has commit-
ted, or is committing, a crime. ' 73 An officer has probable cause to
arrest when he receives information from a third person that the
officer reasonably believes is telling the truth.74  Additionally,
67. Id.
68. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 2000).
69. Id.
70. Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996).
71. Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 521 (7th Cir. 1998).
72. Police officers must make credibility determinations based on their own obser-
vations. Likewise, in a court of law, when "confronted with two conflicting stories and
little else, [a judge] has to base his decision, mainly if not entirely, on his impression of
witnesses." Robert S. Thompson, Decision, Disciplined Inferences and the Adversary
Process, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 725, 726 (1991).
73. Kmetz v. Zenz, 215 F.3d 1330 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jenkins v. Keating, 147
F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998)).
74. Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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"[t]he fact that police officers are presented with conflicting stories
does not preclude a legal arrest when one story is vastly more cred-
ible than another."75 It is also important to note that probable
cause is based on the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest,
regardless of whether that knowledge is correct.7 6
A. The Eyewitness Statement (Citizen-Informant Rule)
The police can base their probable cause determinations on in-
formation from a reliable, known informant or from an indepen-
dent witness.77 Common law suggests that one reliable eyewitness
statement can be enough to support probable cause.78 In Grame-
nos v. Jewel Cos., 79 the court analyzed the existing law and from
that determined that the police may arrest based on a single relia-
ble report.8 0 The court relied on the rule governing informants'
tips, which states that a single reliable informant can supply the
requisite probable cause to issue a warrant. 81 The Gramenos court
reasoned that since a lone eyewitness report could support a war-
rant, a single eyewitness statement could support an arrest.82
Eyewitness' statements are considered reliable because they are
based on firsthand knowledge, therefore, police officers can pre-
sume the reliability and truthfulness of eyewitness statements when
making a probable cause determination.83 "A detailed eye-witness
report of a crime is self-corroborating; it supplies its own indicia of
reliability. 84
75. Augustine v. Reid, 99 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 1995).
76. Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Pjrobable cause depends
on information known to the police at the time, not on how things turn out.");
Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Probable cause does not
depend on the witness turning out to have been right; it's what the police know, not
whether they know the truth, that matters.").
77. Allen, supra note 3, at 891-92.
78. E.g., Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 440 (finding that probable cause existed when the
police arrested based on one statement from a store guard).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (relying on the Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which collectively held that "the
report of one identified, reliable eyewitness creates probable cause").
82. Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 440 (rationalizing that the stakes at trial are higher and
that an arrest only subjects a suspect to a "brief period" of holding with a lower stan-
dard of inquiry).
83. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff's
identification of attacker was sufficient to establish probable cause).
84. United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1976).
2014
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A "citizen-informant" is one who has either witnessed a crime or
was a victim of a crime. Police officers are allowed to act on the
word of such a witness, as they are presumably motivated by good
citizenship and are acting freely to help law enforcement.86 If a
witness comes forth with no ulterior motive, no expectation of pay-
ment, and volunteers information to help the public, then his state-
ment is considered reliable.87
B. Types of Witnesses That Give Statements to the Police
1. Putative Victim
A common type of eyewitness account comes from a putative
victim. 88 "The veracity of citizen complaints who are the victims of
the very crime they report to the police is assumed, ' 89 because
crime victims are considered among the most reliable witnesses. 90
Therefore, when a victim gives a reliable description of his or her
attacker, the police have probable cause to arrest.91 To avoid any
questions of veracity, such a statement constitutes probable cause,
as long as it reasonably appears that the person is telling the
truth.92 However, there are circumstances that can call the victim's
veracity into question; for instance, if the witness has an ulterior
motive.
a. Witness With an Ulterior Motive
(i) Holding a Grudge
One factor that affects the police's assessment of the credibility
of a crime victim is the potential that a witness "holds a grudge"
against the accused.93 If the police have reason to believe that the
85. Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
PITr. L. REV. 227, 236-37 (1984) (citing People v. Schulle, 51 Cal. App. 3d 809, 814
(1975)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 237 (citing People v. Saars, 584 P.2d 622, 626 (Colo. 1978)).
88. Miloslavsky v. AES Eng'ring Soc'y, 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
89. Id.
90. Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering
victims to be reliable because "they usually can provide a first-hand, nonhearsay ac-
count of the criminal activity").
91. Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding probable cause
based on a woman's identification of her husband in a domestic violence case).
92. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000); Lee v. Sandberg, 136
F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997).
93. Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that arresting of-
ficers should take the witness' past history with the accused into account when deter-
mining whether or not probable cause exists).
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person making the statement holds a grudge against the suspect,
then the witness' statement alone does not establish probable
cause.
94
Gardenhire v. Schubert95 is a typical case in which a victim's
harmful agenda calls his veracity into question. 96 In Gardenhire,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
district court finding of no probable cause in plaintiff's action for
an illegal arrest. 97 The case involved an alleged victim's accusation
of theft.98 The witness was a proprietor of a store that was adjacent
to the suspect's business establishment. 99 The informant, Ms. Della
Sala, reported to the police that items were stolen from her
store.100 When the officers responded to Ms. Sala's complaint, they
found all of the items that she had reported stolen in the window of
Mrs. Gardenhire's store. 1 1 Both officers who responded to the call
noted that "the placement of these items was oddly conspicuous,"
as a thief would not be likely to display his spoils.102 Also impor-
tant was the fact that the two women shared a common interior
doorway and had access to each other's stores. 03 Additionally, the
women were in the process of exchanging storefronts, so each store
had property belonging to both proprietors. 104 Because the two
owners had complete access to each other's stores, the fact that the
allegedly stolen items were in the plaintiff's store window was not
enough for the police to find probable cause to arrest.'0 5 The facts
pointed to the possibility that Ms. Sala planted the alleged stolen
items in her neighbor's window.'0 6 The informant's questionable
allegation and probable insincere motive in accusing her neighbor
were not a sufficient basis for probable cause. This case suggests
94. See id. (finding that since the police knew that the tenants might bear a grudge
against their landlords, it would have been unreasonable to arrest the landlords on the
tenants' statement alone); Spiegel v. City of Chicago, 920 F. Supp. 891, 895 (N.D. I11.
1996) (finding that a "long-standing dispute" between the accuser and the accused
should have caused the police to doubt the accuser's reliability).
95. 205 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 303.




101. Id. at 309.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 308.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 309.
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that the police should be careful not to assume automatically the
credibility of a crime victim.
(ii) Bad Relationship
Likewise, a "bad relationship" among the parties in a dispute
puts the witness' credibility into question. 10 7  In Hebron v.
Touhy,108 the court found that a strained relationship between a
landlord and a tenant necessitated something more than the ten-
ant's mere statement to provide probable cause to arrest. 109 In this
action for false arrest, Judge Easterbrook of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the police of-
ficers.1° The police arrived at the scene of a landlord-tenant dis-
pute in which the tenants complained that their landlord cut off
their water and would not let them enter their basement, in an ef-
fort to evict them."' Susie Hebron, the plaintiff landlord, greeted
the police with a butcher knife in her hand." 2 Plaintiff admitted
she refused the tenants' admittance into the basement, but denied
turning off their water." 3 As the tenants had an obvious gripe
against the landlord, their grievance was insufficient to support
probable cause to arrest." 4 The police were, however, able to find
probable cause without relying solely on the tenants' complaint."-5
The police officers checked the state of the water supply, and
found that it was cut off, although the landlord's water was work-
ing.' 1 6 They also tried to verify whether plaintiff had in fact denied
the tenants access to the basement.1 7 The court was satisfied that
the police did an adequate investigation before they arrested the
107. See Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1994) (imposing a further
duty to investigate when alleged victim's reliability was questionable due to the bad
relationship between the parties).
108. 18 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1994).
109. Id. at 422-23.
110. Id. at 421.
111. Id. at 422.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 423 ("[The officers] knew that the tenants were being evicted, and the
significant chance that they bore a grudge against their landlords would have made it




117. Id. at 422.
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plaintiff for depriving his tenants of a utility and use of their
washer-dryer, which was located in the basement.' 1 8
Spiegel v. City of Chicago 19 also involved a personal dispute be-
tween two parties. It involved a long-standing dispute between two
neighbors, concerning noise coming from one of their apart-
ments.1 20 The case originated from a physical altercation between
the neighbors.' 2t Two days after the incident, Spiegel filed a bat-
tery report against his neighbors, Cherny and Bobbin, claiming
they shoved him.122 In response to this charge, Cherny accused
Spiegel of battery. 123 The police questioned Spiegel, the plaintiff,
about the incident over the telephone, and Spiegel contended that
Cherny's allegations were retaliatory and a result of the long-stand-
ing dispute between the parties. 24 Nonetheless, Spiegel turned
himself into the police and was arrested. 25 He subsequently
brought this false arrest claim.126 The court denied the defendant
officers' motion to dismiss the claim, because Judge Castillo found
that the officers had a duty to investigate further before arresting
Spiegel, as they should have been aware that his accusing neighbor
might have borne a grudge against him.127 The facts pointed to
such a scenario, as Cherny waited almost a month before filing a
complaint against Spiegel. The judge also looked to the fact that
Spiegel told the officers of a number of independent witnesses who
would have said that Cherny committed the battery, rather than
Spiegel.' 28 As the officers did not act on these claims and investi-
gate whether Cherny made a false accusation, the court found that
the officers did not have probable cause to arrest.129
b. Gravity of the Situation
The "gravity of the situation" also is taken into account when
police are deciding whether a witness is reliable. 30 For instance, if
an emergency situation or an exigent circumstance exists, then the
118. Id. at 423.
119. 920 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. I11. 1996).
120. Id. at 894-95.
121. Id. at 894.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 894-95.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 894.
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police can rely more readily on the witness' account.13 1 In Llaguno
v. Mingey, 32 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's judgment in favor of defendants in their
§ 1983 action, and granted a new trial due to trial court errors. 33
The plaintiffs claimed a violation of -their Fourth Amendment
rights because the police entered their home without a search war-
rant.13  The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that
the police had probable cause to enter the home of the plaintiff.'35
The existence of probable cause turned on whether or not an emer-
gency existed that would permit the police to enter plaintiff's home
without a warrant. 36 The law states that, "[e]xcept in an emer-
gency ('exigent circumstances'), police may not, with neither a war-
rant nor the homeowner's permission, search a home even though
they have probable cause to believe a search would be fruitful."' 137
The court determined that an emergency situation did exist in this
case. 138 The night of the arrest, the police were pursuing two sus-
pects who committed robberies, killed or wounded several people,
and kidnapped a child. 39 When the suspects' getaway car crashed,
the police captured one of the suspects, while the other was able to
flee. 140 The police found out the license number of the getaway
car, and checked if it was reported stolen. 41 The police then went
to the home of the person to whom the license plate was registered,
in the hopes of finding the other suspect. 4 2 The court determined
that an emergency situation existed-the police were looking for
an armed man who had already shot seven people and was likely to
resist arrest.143 Just as the probable cause standard itself is framed
in terms of reasonableness, so is the determination of an emer-
gency.14 "The amount of information that prudent police will col-
lect before deciding to make a search or an arrest, and hence the
131. Id.
132. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1984).
133. Id. at 1562-63.
134. Id. at 1563-64.
135. Id. at 1563.
136. Id. at 1563-64.
137. Id. at 1564.
138. Id.




143. Id. at 1564.
144. Id. ("The Fourth Amendment contains no checklist of factors constituting an
emergency- contains, indeed, no reference to emergencies. The operative word in
the Fourth Amendment is 'unreasonable'....").
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amount of probable cause they will have, is a function of the grav-
ity of the crime, and especially the danger of its imminent
repetition. 145
c. Discrepancies Within the Witness' Description
Courts generally have held that a victim's statement is reliable
despite discrepancies within the witness' description. 46 This Sub-
Part examines this general rule in the context of cases in which
discrepancies cast doubt on the witness' identification.
In Wilson v. Russo,'47 the court questioned the proposition that a
reliable victim's statement, standing alone, establishes probable
cause.148 In Wilson, a § 1983 action for false arrest, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant of-
ficer.149 The plaintiff alleged the arresting officer lied and left out
material facts from his application for an arrest warrant. 150 First,
the arresting officer, Russo, told the judge that the two victims said
the attacker, Wilson, was between six-foot-three and six-foot-five,
and neglected to tell him that the attacker's driving license indi-
cated that he was five-foot-eleven.' 51 Second, Russo did not tell
the judge that one of the witnesses failed to identify Wilson in a
photo display.152 Rather, he told the judge that the other victim
did identify Wilson and that another witness also had seen him at
the robbery. 53 The issue presented was whether the police of-
ficer's statements to the judge were enough to furnish probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant. 154 The court held that there
was evidence that the police officer omitted facts or asserted un-
145. Id. at 1566 (noting that the police are entitled to shorten their investigation
before arrest or search if a multiple murderer is roaming the streets).
146. E.g., Greene v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.97- 4264, 1998 WL 254062, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1998) ("The principle that probable cause may be based on a
single and reasonably reliable eyewitness identification, even though the identifica-
tion may be tarnished by discrepancies in the witnesses's description of the perpetra-
tor, is well-established."). Contra Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir.
1986) (noting that it might be dangerous for the police to rely solely on eyewitness
descriptions, as they "are notoriously full of inaccuracies").
147. 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000).
148. Id. at 790.
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truths "knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth.' '1 55
However, because these omissions and assertions were not mate-
rial, the court found that probable cause did exist. 156
The court found it troubling to treat "identifications as unim-
peachable. ' 157 Although the court conceded a victim's statement
could stand alone, the rule cannot be considered absolute. 158 The
court argued that the reliability of the witness should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, and as such, should be affected by
exculpatory evidence or evidence of the witness' reliability. 159
Therefore, if a witness' identification otherwise would be reliable,
but for the police having evidence showing the opposite, then the
identification would not supply probable cause.160 To support its
argument, the court pointed to a "boy who cried wolf" situation in
which a victim previously identified several people as her attacker
and in each instance insisted that the police arrest him.1 6' In such a
case, the police should consider the victim's propensity to identify
numerous attackers in assessing her credibility.
Although the court held that inconsistencies in a witness' state-
ment should be a factor, a trivial discrepancy will not likely be fatal
to a finding of probable cause.'62 For instance, the height discrep-
ancy between the witness' identifications and Wilson's actual
height were not enough to negate probable cause.163 Likewise, in
Lallemand v. University of Rhode Island,164 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found probable cause to ar-
rest based on a victim's identification of her assailant as seven in-
ches shorter than his actual height.165
155. Id. at 789.
156. Id. at 792.




161. Id. The Boy Who Cried Wolf is a children's fable involving a shepherd boy who
tricks the townspeople into believing that a wolf is attacking his flock. AEsoP, THE
Boy WHO CRIED WOLF (Story Arts ed.), http://www.storyarts.org/library/aesops/sto-
riesfboy.htmi. He "cries wolf" so many times that he desensitizes the people to the
threat of wolves. Id. In the end, when a real wolf comes and eats his flock, nobody
comes to his rescue. Id. The moral of the story is that "[n]obody believes a liar ...
even when he is telling the truth!" Id.
162. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 791.
163. Id. at 791-92.
164. 9 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 1993).
165. Id. at 215 n.1.
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2. Store Guard
A number of cases have involved eyewitness statements to police
from an authority figure within a retail establishment. 66 The ques-
tion posed in these cases is whether these witnesses deserve more
credibility because of their positions of authority.
A paradigmatic case in which the police relied upon a store se-
curity guard's statement to arrest a suspect was Gramenos v. Jewel
Cos."'67 In this action for false arrest, Judge Easterbrook affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant police officers. 68 The court found that probable cause ex-
isted to arrest the suspected shoplifter in a supermarket. 169 When
the police arrived on the scene, the store guard, Vaughn, recounted
what he saw.' 70 The guard told the police that he witnessed the
suspect, Gramenos, conceal several items in his pocket before at-
tempting to exit the store.' 71 Vaughn also said that when he con-
fronted Gramenos, the suspect started running through the aisles
while purging his pockets of the concealed items . 72 Gramenos
tried to exculpate himself by denying that he removed items from
his pockets.173 The police believed Vaughn's account and arrested
Gramenos for shoplifting.174 Gramenos contended that the police
did not interview other witnesses, leaving the guard's statement un-
corroborated. 75 The police however, argued, that they did inter-
view other witnesses whose stories corroborated Vaughn's. 76 The
court only relied on the undisputed facts in deciding the summary
judgment motion. 177 The court took account of the fact that
166. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 95-50056, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18498,
at *6 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (finding probable cause when a security guard alerted
the police that the suspect was carrying a gun); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63
F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding probable cause because the officer was di-
rectly advised by the storeowner, who was present during the crime); United States v.
Williams, No. 92-3377, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12703, at *3 (7th Cir. May 17, 1993)
(finding probable cause when witness' description of suspect's vehicle was corrobo-
rated by a security guard); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 438-42 (7th Cir.
1986) (relying on security guard's signed criminal complaint was sufficient to establish
probable cause to arrest suspected shoplifter).
167. Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 432.
168. Id. at 433.
169. Id. at 432.
170. Id. at 433.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 437.
174. Id. at 434.
175. Id. at 437.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 438.
2022
DO THE CLOTHES MAKE THE MAN?
Vaughn, a store guard, told the police that Gramenos tried to
shoplift, that Gramenos denied the allegation, and that the police
did not interview anyone but Vaughn. 178 In determining the of-
ficers had probable cause to arrest, the court found that the police
relied on Vaughn's status as an authority to' determine he was a
credible witness.179
a. Reasons to Trust a Store Guard
There are various reasons why the police should trust a store
security guard's statement. The usual risk involved in believing an
unknown witness, namely, that he may be holding a grudge, is less-
ened in an institutional setting.180 The store employee faces nega-
tive repercussions if he falsely accuses a patron of a crime.181 The
store also has an interest in ensuring that the guard does not act
rashly, because the store would not want to offend an honest cus-
tomer, for fear of losing business or a costly tort suit.' 82 Therefore,
there is a "reasonable reliability that a security guard as a profes-
sional in an institutional setting would not bring a claim based on a
grudge or without careful consideration.' '1 83
In another action for false arrest, United States v. Rodriguez,'84
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that police officers had
probable cause to arrest a man by relying on an uncorroborated tip
from a uniformed security guard. 185 In Rodriguez, a gang task
force set out to seize unlawful firearms in Los Angeles. 186 A secur-
ity guard informed the officers that there was a man in a nearby
restaurant carrying a concealed gun. 187 The officers went into the
restaurant, at which point the suspect who matched the guard's
description walked away from where he was sitting. 188 The court
found that the officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect
based on the totality of the circumstances. 189 First, the suspect
178. Id.
179. See id. at 439.
180. Id.
181. Id. (reasoning that a guard's false accusation could lead to disgrace or termina-
tion, which are "automatic penalties that the police are entitled to consider").
182. Id.
183. Spiegel v. City of Chicago, 920 F. Supp. 891, 898 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
184. No. 95-50056, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18498 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (affirming
the trial court's finding of probable cause).
185. Id. at *6.
186. Id. at *2.
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matched the guard's description, in both physical appearance and
location. 190 Second, the suspect started to walk away when he
spotted the police, signaling his guilt.' 9' Finally, the court imposed
no duty on the police to corroborate an eyewitness account of a
crime. 192 This case illustrates the advantage police have when rely-
ing on a security guard's tip. By allowing the police to rely on an
uncorroborated tip, the court endorsed the idea that security
guards are presumed reliable.
United States v. Williams'93 provides another example of police
reliance on a statement from a security guard to supply probable
cause. In Williams, the police arrested two men based on the state-
ment of a guard who relayed information from the victim.194 The
guard was not recounting what he witnessed firsthand, but rather
repeated what the victim had told him.'95 The fact that he relayed
a message from another did not necessarily diminish the guard's
credibility, because the person telling the guard what happened
was a victim, whose statement alone can furnish probable cause. 96
Therefore, the police properly relied on the guard's statement to
establish probable cause to arrest.
b. Reasons Not To Trust a Store Guard
Although there are several reasons why a store guard should
garner more credibility than an ordinary eyewitness, there are also
reasons why the police should be cautious when relying on a
guard's tale. A guard may carry the same biases as any other eye-
witness.' 97 The dissent in United States v. Rodriguez'98 cautioned
against deeming all tips from security guards reliable. 99 Judge Fer-
guson warned of the danger in "characterizing the security guard's
tip as 'a detailed eyewitness report of a crime,' [because] then any




193. No. 92-3377, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12703 (7th Cir. May 17, 1993).
194. Id. at *24.
195. Id. at *2.
196. See supra Part II.B for an analysis, specifically notes 88-92 and accompanying
text.
197. See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 95-50056, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18498, at
*9 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1996).
198. Id.
199. Id. at *9 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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his adversary was in possession of a gun and the police would have
probable cause to arrest the adversary. "200
In Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff,2° 1 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a dismissal of plaintiff's false arrest claim based
on a finding of probable cause.2 °2 The court found that a police
officer acted lawfully when he relied on the statements of a store
clerk and store manager to arrest a suspect.2 °3 In this case, the
plaintiff, Singer, went to a mini supermarket to purchase items to
aid in his search for a missing hunter.20 4 He was in a hurry, so he
asked the store clerk if he could take the items and pay for them
later.20 5 The store clerk admitted that Singer handed him a list of
the items that he took, but denied agreeing to Singer's terms of
payment.20 6 The store clerk informed the store manager of
Singer's alleged theft.20 7 The two store employees then told the
police of the events, and the police subsequently arrested Singer
for petit larceny.20 8 The court found probable cause even though it
questioned the motives of the store employees. 20 9 The police ar-
rested Singer based on the store employees' statements even
though the police suspected they might have insincere motives.210
3. Police Officer's Statement
A number of cases involve arrests based on another police of-
ficer's statement.21' In these cases, one officer imputes his knowl-
edge to another officer who was not present when the alleged
crime happened. The court must determine whether or not the
other officer's statement was a sufficient basis for finding probable
cause. A police officer can rely on a fellow officers's crime scene
account, as long as the officer is credible and his story is plausi-
200. Id.
201. 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995).
202. Id. at 118.
203. Id. at 118-19.




208. Id. Petit larceny is the "[l]arceny of property worth less than a statutory cutoff
amount, usu. $100." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 886 (7th ed. 1999).
209. Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 (holding that motivation is not considered in evaluating
probable cause determinations).
210. See id.
211. E.g., Shaw v. City of New York, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4901, at *10-11
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997) (allowing one police officer to impute his knowledge to an-
other officer, providing the necessary probable cause to arrest).
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ble.212 The "fellow officer rule" provides that an officer can law-
fully act solely on the basis of fellow officers' statements if the
officers issuing the statements possessed the facts and circum-
stances necessary to support a finding of probable cause. 213 This
Sub-Part analyzes the soundness of the fellow officer rule.
a. Questioning the Validity of the "Fellow Officer Rule"
An officer, as a servant of the law, presumably tells the truth.
However, relying on a police officer as a witness is not an absolute
guarantee of truthfulness. One reason to question the validity of
one officer relying on another's statement to provide probable
cause is the "blue code of silence," requiring an officer to cover up
a fellow officer's lie.214 Another reason to question a rule allowing
the police to rely on statements of other members of the force is
the pervasive problem of police lying. 15 Police officers have ad-
mitted that "lying is a regular feature of the life of a cop. '216 One
212. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 635 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Lennon v.
Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the arresting officer was reasona-
ble in relying on another officer's version of the events, even though there were con-
flicting accounts).
213. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-67 (1971); Mendoza v. City of Rome,
872 F. Supp. 1110, 1116 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Under [the fellow officer rule] arresting
officers may rely upon information or direction from another officer because the di-
recting officer is presumed to possess probable cause."); People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d
761, 764 (Cal. 1983) (terming the Whiteley rule of imputation the "fellow officer"
rule).
214. Shaw, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4901, at *14-15 (showing a reason to doubt an-
other officer's statement); Cindy Gonzalez & Karyn Spencer, Handling of Shooting
Called Gutsy by Some, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 13, 2000, at 1A ("The blue
code of silence is a 'protect your own' mentality .. "); Mark O'Keefe, 'Culture of
Lying' Hurts Credibility Police Everywhere; People Less Willing to Believe the Cops,
Times-Picayune, May 14, 2000, at Al (discussing the "subculture in policing," where
the blue code of silence entails that as a police officer "you don't squeal on another
officer, no matter what, even if it means planting a weapon or drugs on someone, or
whatever it takes.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. See generally David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility,
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 457-58 (1999).
Scandals involving police misconduct-brutality, corruption, criminality-
are regularly featured in the daily newspapers, and periodic investigation
reports and blue-ribbon commissions come up with the same conclusions:
police scandals are cyclical; official misconduct, corruption, brutality, and
criminality are endemic; and necessarily, so is police lying to disguise and
deny it.
Id.
216. Id. at 457.
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study showed seventy-six percent of police polled acknowledged
that police witnesses alter their stories to prove probable cause.217
Shaw v. City of New York 218 is a typical case questioning the va-
lidity of assuming officer credibility. In Shaw, officer Fitzgibbons
arrested a suspect based on fellow officer Kicki's statement.219 The
arresting officer arrived on the scene after the alleged crime and,
therefore, had no personal knowledge of the facts.220 The plaintiff
in this false arrest action alleged that Fitzgibbons lacked probable
cause because he relied on Kicki's statement despite knowing that
Kicki was lying.22' The plaintiff directly questioned the validity of
officer Kicki's statement.
The court found that probable cause existed because the arrest-
ing officer was entitled to rely on what the original officer told
him.222 The court found no reason why Fitzgibbons should have
questioned the veracity of Kicki's statement.223 Underlying such a
ruling is the question of whether the court ruled in favor of the
police simply because it assumed a police officer would tell the
truth. In this particular instance, the plaintiff offered no evidence
to substantiate his claim that the officer was lying.224 However, in a
case with conflicting evidence supporting stories from both a police
officer and a suspect, this question becomes more pertinent.225
b. Arguing for the Soundness of the "Fellow Officer Rule"
Although there are times when the police should not be deemed
credible sources of information, there is value in allowing police
officers to rely on their comrades to supply the information needed
217. Id. at 457 n.9. Contra O'Keefe, supra note 214, at Al (citing a November 1999
national Gallup Poll rating police ninth in honesty, out of forty-five main professions).
Patrol Sergeant Kevin Conley, the president of the police honor guard in Columbus,
Ohio, said that in his nineteen years of police experience, "he has not seen any lying
to cover up wrongdoing or strengthen a case, nor any encouragement of it." Id. Con-
ley is concerned that the police as a whole are being "tarnished by the misdeeds of a
few." Id.
218. Shaw, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4901 at *14-15.
219. Id. at *3.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *12.
222. Id. at *10-14.
223. Id. at *14 ("Absent any evidence tending to show that it was objectively unrea-
sonable for Officer Fitzgibbons to believe Officer Kicki, Officer Fitzgibbons could
rely on what Officer Kicki told him.").
224. Id. at *12.
225. See, e.g., Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 70 F. Supp. 2d 300 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding that the arresting officer was entitled to rely on a fellow officer's ver-
sion of the altercation, despite plaintiff's protestations of innocence).
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to support probable cause. The fellow officer rule "furthers the
objective of aiding the police in law enforcement, '226 and by al-
lowing officers to rely on their colleagues' word, courts have en-
hanced police efficiency.227
To effectively police, officers must be able to rely on each other,
a practice which is facilitated by the imputation rule.228 Officers
are frequently placed in life or death situations, in which they must
be able to trust one another. The imputation rule is a product of
the police's need to depend on each other in their day-to-day
duties.
There are many different types of witnesses that come to the po-
lice with criminal allegations, 2 9 and many reasons why each type
of witness may be more or less reliable in the eyes of the officer.230
The citizen-informant rule allows police to rely on the statement of
an eyewitness to supply probable cause to arrest.2 31 Among the
types of witnesses that may come forth are ordinary citizens, store
guards, and fellow police officers. Probable cause analysis is done
at the scene of the crime without time for reflection; therefore, po-
lice officers may rely on the witness' status to indicate credibility.
Police may deem the witness' status as dispositive of credibility, or
they may take status into consideration, relying on other factors as
well. In short, police may employ the rules regarding witness credi-
bility in either a rigid, or a more flexible manner.
226. Vincent Martin Bonventre, Court of Appeals-State Constitutional Law Re-
view, 1991, 14 PACE L. REV. 353, 370 (1994) (citing People v. Rosario, 585 N.E.2d 766,
768 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that the rule of imputation "enabl[es] law enforcement to do
its job")).
227. See Landy v. Irizarry, 884 F. Supp. 788, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that since
the original police officer "was unquestionably a reliable source of information and
since his own knowledge of Plaintiff's conduct gave him probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff, it follows logically that the same knowledge gave [the second officer] proba-
ble cause to arrest Plaintiff"); see also Carson v. Lewis, 35 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding that the collective knowledge of police officers can be imputed to an
individual police officer).
228. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) ("To prevent arresting officers
from acting on the assumption that fellow officers who call upon them to make an
arrest have probable cause for believing the arrestees are perpetrators of a crime
would ... unduly hamper law enforcement.").
229. Supra Part II.B.
230. Compare Part II.B.2.a., with Part II.B.2.b.
231. Supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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HI. ASSESSING THE FACTORS THE POLICE TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT WHEN DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
"[P]rotection from arbitrary arrest and search are perhaps the
quintessential hallmarks of a free society. ' 23 2 The Fourth Amend-
ment is of great importance in American society because a citizen's
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a criti-
cal facet of democracy. The Fourth Amendment is pivotal "be-
cause the scope given to the protections of the amendment, which
occupies a place second to none in the Bill of Rights, largely deter-
mines the kind of society in which we live. ' 233 A police force that
arbitrarily can arrest citizens places the very freedom of those citi-
zens in jeopardy.2 34 As the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental
right, the manner in which courts interpret it is highly important.
To ensure that people's rights are enforced fairly, courts should en-
force the rules regarding witness credibility in a flexible manner.
The witness' status should not be dispositive of credibility. The
status of the witness should be only one of many factors that police
take into account when making a probable cause determination.
The factors should not be looked at in a vacuum. The probable
cause inquiry is not a rigid, scientific formula; rather, it is an amor-
phous standard defined by the terms "reasonable" and "prudent."
The probable cause standard is flexible and open to interpretation
by the courts.
A. Tort Law as a Model
"A great deal of American litigation involves standards of liabil-
ity and measures of damages which are models of imprecision,
most frequently where the standard or measure is based upon what
is 'reasonable.' 235 Tort law is one area of the law that employs
flexible standards.23 6 Proponents of the flexible nature of tort law
argue that vague standards are proper because the rules are prag-
matic.2 37 The standards are practical because they are designed to
232. Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense; A Reply to the Critics
of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 519 n.321 (1984).
233. Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Im-
perceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1171 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Grano, supra note 232, at 519.
235. Thompson, supra note 72, at 762.
236. Id. Tort law encompasses two malleable standards. Id. First, negligence in-
volves "the reasonably prudent person test." Id. Second, damages for pain and suf-
fering are calculated by "reducing the unquantifiable to terms of money." Id.
237. Id.
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reach fair outcomes in individual cases.238 In tort cases, juries
reach verdicts that "enforce community standards through intuitive
normative judgments concerning financial responsibility. 239
Bright line rules do not work in tort law because they do not allow
for enough leeway to provide just results in individual cases. In
essence, "[f]airness would be a casualty of precision in tort
doctrine. 240
"The failure of judicial attempts to articulate bright line rules for
the resolution of tort disputes may point to a lesson for [F]ourth
[A]mendment litigation as well. ' 241 In the context of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, a flexible rule is wise because it "de-
fines constitutional boundaries most precisely. '242 Additionally, it
can adjust to fit the different fact situations that can take place.243
Police-citizen encounters are so varied that standardized proce-
dures cannot always command the proper police response.244
Rules regarding probable cause can offer guidance to the police,
however, they cannot anticipate all of the different situations that
the police may encounter.245 Therefore, these rules should be em-
ployed in a flexible manner, taking account of the multitude of sit-
uations confronting the police.
B. The United States Supreme Court Supports a
Flexible Approach
The Supreme Court endorsed the idea of a flexible approach to
Fourth Amendment adjudication in the context of informants' tips.
In Illinois v. Gates,246 the Court adopted a totality of the circum-
stances approach in determining whether an informant's tip sup-
plied the requisite probable cause.247 In Gates, the Court
238. Id.
239. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 762-63.
241. Alschuler, supra note 85, at 232.
242. Poulin, supra note 3, at 136.
243. Id.
244. Gerald G. Ashdown, Good Faith, The Exclusionary Remedy, and Rule-Ori-
ented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 335, 365 (1983)
("Fourth [A]mendment encounters between the police and the public are simply too
numerous and too varied to be subject to standardized procedures that will always
dictate the appropriate police response.").
245. Id.
246. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
247. Id. at 230-31.
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abandoned the two-pronged test that it fashioned in Aguilar v.
Texas248 and Spine//i v. United States. 249
The Court developed the Aguilar-Spinelli test to direct magis-
trates in their determination of whether an informant's tip supplies
the probable cause necessary to issue a search warrant.25 0 The first
prong, or the "basis of knowledge" prong, required the informer to
have received his information from personal knowledge or another
trustworthy method.251 The Court designed this prong to exclude
rumors.252 The second prong was satisfied if the informer was
deemed credible or his information was reliable.253 This prong
could be met if the informer previously had given the police relia-
ble information. 4 Each of these prongs had to be established
independently.255
In Spinelli, the Court illuminated the Aguilar test, by highlight-
ing the fact that each prong had to be met separately. 6 The Court
extended the test by suggesting ways in which a deficiency in one of
the prongs could be overcome. 7 A defect in the first prong could
be fixed with the "self-verifying detail technique." '258 This tech-
nique required a sufficient amount of detail to ensure that the in-
formant was not relying on a rumor. 259 A shaky veracity prong
could be remedied if there was independent police corroboration
of just part of the tip.2 60 The prong would be satisfied if a tip like
the corroborated tip would pass Aguilar's test without corrobora-
tion.261 The idea was that the corroborative details would bolster
the credibility of the unconfirmed portion of the tip.2 62
248. 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964) (determining "the constitutional requirements for ob-
taining a state search warrant").
249. 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (holding that the informant's tip did not supply the requi-
site probable cause for the magistrate to issue a search warrant).
250. Alexander P. Woollcott, Recent Developments: Abandonment of the Two-Pro-
nged Aguilar-Spinelli Test: Illinois v. Gates, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 316, 316 (1985).




255. Id. at 320-21.
256. Id. at 321.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 322 (quoting Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and
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The Aguilar and Spinelli decisions collectively made up the test
guiding magistrates in their determination of whether an inform-
ant's tip furnished probable cause. The Court revisited the issue in
Gates,26 3 and replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli test with a totality of the
circumstances approach to better serve law enforcement needs.
The Court rejected the overly technical and unduly rigid two-pro-
nged test.264 However, the Court held that the prongs are still use-
ful in steering the totality of the circumstances approach, and
should be factored in.265 The two prongs are "closely intertwined"
with the question of probable cause and they "may usefully illumi-
nate the common-sense, practical question whether there is 'proba-
ble cause.' "266
The reasoning the Court used in Gates is useful in analyzing the
rules regarding witness credibility in probable cause determina-
tions. Just as the two prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test should be
factored into the totality of the circumstances inquiry, the rules re-
garding witness credibility should be a factor in the analysis of
whether probable cause exists. The inquiry must remain flexible,
however, to ensure that the rigidity of the rules do not impede
justice.
"When the best rules that our powers can devise produce injus-
tice often enough, we do well to abandon them even at the price of
lawlessness. '267 Professor Wayne R. LaFave, a Fourth Amendment
authority has said of Fourth Amendment rules:
Fourth Amendment doctrine ... is primarily intended to regu-
late the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be
expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in
the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are
necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, quali-
fied by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing
of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of
heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
263. 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
264. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-35.
Unlike a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced assess-
ment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unre-
liability) attending an informant's tip, the "two-pronged test" has
encouraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips, with un-
due attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be di-
vorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.
Id.
265. Id. at 230.
266. Id.
267. Alschuler, supra note 85, at 227.
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eagerly feed, but they may be 'literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field.' 268
LaFave has argued that, although rules regarding the Fourth
Amendment are necessary to guide police action, they are difficult
to implement in practice.269
C. The Weaknesses of Witness Credibility Rules
A rule that regards a witness as inherently credible based upon
who he is can be problematic in the unpredictable world of police-
citizen encounters. The judicially created rule that eyewitness
statements or putative victim statements supply their own stamp of
reliability should be questioned in light of all the different situa-
tions in which such a witness will come forth.270 The multifarious
backgrounds of the various witnesses make such a rule questiona-
ble. For instance, the possibility of there being a bad relationship
among the accuser and the accused, or of the witness holding a
grudge against the accused, argues against the rigidity of the rule
regarding witness statements.2 7 1 Likewise, a witness who is like the
"boy who cried wolf" should not necessarily be taken at his
word.272 For example, a person who comes into a police station
alleging a crime, may preface his statement by telling the officers
that he previously alleged the same crime erroneously. The police
may arrest the alleged criminal on the basis of the witness' state-
ment because of the citizen-informant rule. However, such an ar-
rest would be unreasonable in light of the witness' background. A
rigid application of the rule would lead to an unjust result. The law
must provide leeway for officers to deviate from the strictness of
the rule in special circumstances. Officers must not behave as
"automatons. " 2 7 3
There is no formal rule that an employee with authority figure
status should be deemed inherently reliable. However, some
courts have implied that store guards or storeowners are trustwor-
268. Id. at 230 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, 'Case-by-Case Adjudication' Versus
'Standardized Procedures': The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141-42
(quoted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981))).
269. Id.
270. See discussion supra Part II.
271. See discussion supra Part II.A.
272. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000); see also supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
273. Aischuler, supra note 85, at 237. Police officers must not act like robots; they
should be able to "recognize the need for departures from generally appropriate doc-
trines in exceptional circumstances." Id.
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thy by holding that their statements were enough to supply the nec-
essary probable cause.274 In Gramenos v. Jewel Cos.,275 the court
listed several reasons why police should believe store guards. 6
Although the police should take the witness' authoritative position
into account when making a probable cause determination, they
should not use it as a defining mark of veracity. Store guards and
storeowners are subject to the same credibility hazards as any
other witness. 277
The common law rule allowing police officers to impute their
knowledge to other officers if they have the requisite information
to supply probable cause 278 is weakened by the possibility of police
lying.279 However, the requirement that the original officer's state-
ment be credible is a safeguard against police abuse of the rule.
Additionally, the police become more efficient as they are able to
rely on their colleague's work instead of having to do more time
consuming investigation. Allowing the police to rely on other of-
ficers' statements, enables them to apprehend alleged criminals
and arrest them before they conceivably could do more harm to
society. In essence, the rule makes the police more effective in car-
rying out their law enforcement duties.
D. Witness Credibility Rules Should Be a Factor in the
Probable Cause Analysis
Although the rules regarding the judgment of witness credibility
are problematic, they do serve an important function by providing
guidance for the police.28° More rigid rules arguably protect peo-
ple from intrusions on their Fourth Amendment rights.28' In Dun-
away v. New York, 82 the Court stated that "a single familiar
standard is essential to guide police officers. '283 The Court was
concerned that the balancing of many different factors in determin-
ing probable cause could erode the protections offered by the
274. See supra note 166 and cases cited therein.
275. 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986).
276. Id. at 439; see supra Part II.B.
277. See, e.g., Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (find-
ing probable cause even in light of possible bad motives of the store employees).
278. See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
279. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
280. Alschuler, supra note 85, at 237 ("The judicially created rule concerning 'citi-
zen-informants' provides useful general guidance to police officers.").
281. Poulin, supra note 3, at 136.
282. 442 U.S. 200 (979).
283. Id. at 213-14.
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Fourth Amendment.284 The "often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime" only compounds this perceived problem.285 If the
police are armed with a rigid set of rules, then they can act in ac-
cordance with those rules.2 86 The existence of rules to guide the
police leads to consistency in the protection of people's Fourth
Amendment rights by protecting people from unwarranted intru-
sions on their privacy.287 Additionally, bright line rules "ease the
courts' administrative burden. ' 288 Finally, rules guiding police of-
ficers on the street limit subjective judgment and control
corruption.289
Although bright line rules are useful in some circumstances, the
wide variety of situations that confront police officers often make
them unworkable in their rigid form. Rules regarding witness cred-
ibility should not be discounted. However, police officers should
use these rules as guidelines, and not as absolute truths. The prob-
able cause standard is such that the police can be guided by rules
regarding witness credibility, but also can be offered some leeway
by the totality of circumstances doctrine290 that frames the stan-
dard. Therefore, they can take the witness' status into account
when making a probable cause determination, but must not take
that status to be the controlling factor.
When determining probable cause, the police should look at the
entire situation that confronts them. They should rely on logic and
intuition. The police also should take what they have learned from
past experience into account.2 91 The police must not ignore com-
mon sense.292 At the same time, officers should be wary of incon-
284. See id.
285. Id.
286. Poulin, supra note 3, at 143; Alschuler, supra note 85, at 230 ("[The security
that the [F]ourth [A]mendment was designed to protect] can only be realized if the
police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to
reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justi-
fied in the interest of law enforcement.") (quoting LaFave, supra note 268, at 141-42)
(quoted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
287. Poulin, supra note 3, at 141.
288. Id. at 145 ("If the rule is well-defined, the retrospective decision that the po-
lice, however well intentioned, failed to comply may serve to guide future action.").
289. Alschuler, supra note 85, at 227.
290. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 218 (1983); see also supra note 9 and accompa-
nying text.
291. United States v. Fisher, 701 F.2d 372, 378 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The experience of a
police officer is a factor to be considered in the determination of probable cause .. )
(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
292. Grano, supra note 234, at 465 ("Common sense, of course, is not the only thing
a system of law relies on. It is not a substitute for knowledge. It cannot compete with
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sistent facts or anomalies that stand out and cast doubt on the
witness. Any conflicting accounts should heighten the officers'
awareness of a possible fraud. In the end, the police must be rea-
sonable in their actions and determine the credibility of the wit-
nesses based on all of the factors and circumstances before them.
CONCLUSION
Relying on the status of a witness can aid the police in assessing
the witness'credibility. However, it also can be dangerous if the
police solely rely on the status, and fail to give proper weight to
other facts or circumstances. Therefore, although the rules regard-
ing witness credibility do serve an important function in law en-
forcement, they must be used with caution. These rules should be
employed with flexibility to ensure that they keep the people's
Fourth Amendment rights intact while they protect society from
crime.
'expertise.' But it is common sense which determines the relevance and weight of
knowledge in specific situations.").
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